



BRILL

JOURNAL OF AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS

24 (2017) 209-232

THE JOURNAL OF
AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN
RELATIONS
brill.com/jaer

“A Permitted Haven in a Heartless World: Colleges and Churches in South Korea in the 1950s”

Kim Dong-Choon

Sung Kong Hoe University

dckim@skhu.ac.kr

Abstract

In the 1950s, Christianity and educational achievement were the primary means for Koreans to break through the misery and powerlessness that the Korean conflict from June 1950 to July 1953 had caused. Along with education, religion was a promising route in securing familial welfare for South Koreans. Among the several religions and denomination, Protestant churches were more popular for the uprooted people residing in urban areas. These two privately motivated daily activities—education and religion—captured the concern of the Korean people who had lost everything during the war. Under President Syngman Rhee’s “police state” and infrastructural ruin, religious and educational institutions filled the vacuum in the Republic of Korea that the Korean War had left in civil society. The Korean “habitus” of family promotion in the 1950s foretold the fast economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s. This paper will show how South Korea during that decade witnessed the formation of a new familialism, which tended to focus on the family’s accumulation of power and money as a final goal. Ethical understandings and political decisions were secondary to the main priority of family promotion.

Keywords

Korea – education fever – Christianity – familialism – anti-communism – Korean War

On 23 November 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama referred to South Korea’s “education fever” (*kyoyuk yŏlgi*)¹ at a Washington forum launching the

1 Academics and the public in the Republic of Korea and elsewhere commonly use the term “education fever” to refer to the South Korean population’s enthusiastic—for some observers obsessive—embrace of educational opportunities.

“Educate to Innovate” campaign. In his speech, he referred to the importance of Korean parents in shaping the enormous expansion of Korea’s education system over the prior forty years.² While education fever has been a remarkable phenomenon across East Asia, South Korean conduct and attitudes about education have been more competitive and ambitious than that of people in other countries in the region, including Japan.³ In the Republic of Korea (ROK), 85 percent of adults between the ages of 25 and 64 have earned the equivalent of a high school degree, which is nine percent higher than the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) figure of 76 percent.⁴ Observers agree that education fever has contributed to South Korea’s extraordinary economic miracle. In fact, many have argued that it is responsible for the ROK’s rapid transition into a modern capitalist society, successfully achieving economic development and democratization in a short period of time.⁵

Nevertheless, foreigners, including former President Obama, seem to lose sight of the costs of South Korea’s education fever. They also fail to consider how and when, with which connections, and under what conditions South Korea’s emphasis on meritocracy has appeared. Surveys have indicated that South Korean students are among the least happy young people in OECD countries as a consequence of the pressures of preparing the college entrance examination and achieving academic excellence. Significantly, the youth in the ROK has one of the highest suicide rates in the developed world.⁶ Sociologist Ronald Dore, who coined the term “diploma disease,” has identified one reason for this unhappy result.⁷ After studying Japanese society, he argued that “the Japanese system is one of the most single-mindedly meritocratic in the world [and] similar in that respect to those of other post-Confucian countries—both Chinas, Singapore and both Koreas.”⁸

2 “Obama Remarks on Math, Science and Technology Education,” *Washington Post*, 23 November 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/23/AR2009112301978.html> (accessed 28 May 2017).

3 Takayasu Nakamura, “Educational System and Parental Fever in Contemporary Japan: Comparison with the Case of South Korea,” *KEDI Journal of Educational Policy* 2, no. 1 (2005): 35–49.

4 “Education,” OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] Better Life Index, <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/education/> (accessed 26 May 2017).

5 See, for example, Dae Hyung Woo and Howard Kahm, “Road to School: Primary school participation in Korea, 1911–1960” in this issue of the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*.

6 Hyosik Lee, “Korean Students Least Happy in OECD,” *The Korea Times*, 4 May 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/05/113_86432.html (accessed 28 May 2017).

7 Ronald Dore, *The Diploma Disease* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

8 Ronald Dore, *Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 204.

To be sure, diploma disease appeared in postwar South Korea when the modern higher education system came into being. However, a similar kind of certificate-fetishism for educated persons had prevailed since the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910). Indeed, Korea's education fever and meritocratic system are partly a product of Confucian culture. Under the Chosŏn dynasty, civil service examinations, known as *kwagŏ*, shaped the aspirations of the ambitious because they were the exclusive avenues for gaining access to power, economic benefits, and social status.⁹ This tradition has a counterpart in modern Korean society, as most families express their desire to send their children to college to gain membership in the old ruling class (*yangban*). From the past to the present, the yearnings of family well being therefore have driven education fever. But understanding the nature and origins of contemporary education fever is not enough to explain fully this phenomenon. One must also consider in conjunction with it other closely interlinked cultural and political circumstances, especially, since the 1950s, the explosion of churches and familialism in South Korea.¹⁰

Many observers perceive Korean Protestantism as constituting a marvelous chapter in modern history, and the denomination has experienced rapid growth. South Korea has become the second largest exporter of Protestant missionaries in the world, with more than 27,000 evangelists proselytizing abroad in 2015.¹¹ Yŏido Full Gospel Church is the world's largest congregation, with an estimated membership of 825,000 in 2016.¹² Nevertheless, many Christian theologians lament that congregants observe the Shaman-influenced "Praying

9 Pak Hyein, "Han'guksahoeŭi kyoyukyŏle taehan yŏksajŏk koch'al: kwagŏsihŏmi kajok, sahoe e mich'in yŏnghyangŭl chungsimuro" ["Historical Approach to Educational Aspirations: The Influence of Civil Service Examinations, Kwagŏ, to the Family and Society"], *Han'gukkajŏng kwallihakhojei [Journal of the Association for Korean Household Management]* 12, no. 1 (1994): 83–92.

10 Familialism (familism) gives precedence to family interests over those relating to politics and society. While the traditional concept of family extended to blood relations in a village, in modern familialism, family membership is quite restricted. The modern family unit—the nuclear family—consists of parents and children alone. See Dongno Kim, "The Transformation of Familism in Modern Korean Society: From Cooperation to Competition," *International Sociology* 5, no. 4 (December 1990): 409–25.

11 "Over 27,000 Korean Missionaries Ministering Worldwide, According to Study," *Christianity Daily*, 8 June 2016, <http://www.christianitydaily.com/articles/8179/20160608/over-27-000-korean-missionaries-ministering-worldwide-according-study.htm> (accessed 27 May 2017).

12 Andrew Johnson, "A Crisis of Integrity in Seoul, the Megachurch Capital of the World," USC Center for Religion and Civic Culture, <https://crcc.usc.edu/a-crisis-of-integrity-in-seoul-the-megachurch-capital-of-the-world/> (accessed 28 May 2017).

for a Blessing” in the practice of Korean Christianity.¹³ At “Prayer Mountain”—a religious site constructed on high ground in Seoul for the purpose of prayer and meditation—the boundary between Christianity and Shamanism becomes blurred. Christian practitioners emphasize charismatic practices that Korean Shamanism partly shaped, which teaches people to pray only for their family’s happiness and welfare. Those Christians who have prayed for their family fortunes while neglecting broader societal and political endeavors have contributed greatly to the rapid growth of evangelistic churches in the ROK. The explosion of colleges and churches as modern institutions have been expressions of how familialism has generated the eagerness of South Koreans both to cast off their misery and to attain material and spiritual blessings.

After Japanese colonialism ended in 1945, South Korea pursued modernization with the persistence of a traditional pattern of social congregation—family solidarity and promotion. Pre-modern familism transformed into a new familialism as a type of utilitarianism in an urban-industrial setting.¹⁴ Compared with the low levels of civic participation and activism in there after 1953, collective organizations engaged in religious and educational institutions that related to the well being of families flourished after the Korean War. To understand the modernization of South Korea fully, then, one should focus on the dynamics of civil society, especially those activities related to religion and education. Studying educational and religious institutions shows how the building of the modern state and the capitalist system reshaped family-oriented behavior, which points to the underlying complexities of South Korean development.

13 “Praying for a Blessing,” a prominent feature of Korean Christianity, is also a distinctive feature of Korean Buddhism and Korean Shamanism. Kim Hŭngsu, *Han’guk chŏnjaenggwa kidoksinang hwaksan yŏn’gu* [*The Korean War and the Spread of “Praying for a Blessing”*]. Seoul: Han’guk kidoggyo yŏksa yŏn’guso, 1999).

14 The pattern in Korea resembled that in Hong Kong. See Sui-Kai Lau, “Chinese Familism in an Urban-Industrial Setting: The Case of Hong Kong,” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 43, no. 4 (November 1981): 977–92. For Sui-Kai Lau, characterizing urban-based familism are the “primacy of familial interests, perception of the social-political context as the arena for the pursuit of familial interests, utilitarianistic considerations in the structuring of intrafamilial relationships, the nonsignificance of social status of the familial group, utilitarianistic recruitment of familial members and the resultant vagueness of the boundary of the familial group, and the dilution of authority relationships between familial members.” Significant dimensions of familism include a “normative orientation toward the family as a collective entity, affective-cognitive identification with the family individual’s perception of his obligations and responsibilities toward the family.” *Ibid.*, pp. 977–78.

To examine South Korea's complex modernization under national division and the Cold War requires a review of the social dynamics of the pre-industrial era, the period when the ROK remained largely agrarian in its economic orientation. In this sense, South Korea during the 1950s constituted a special period that interludes between nation building and full-scale economic development, predating the accelerated industrialization drive under Pak Chŏng-hŭi. As full-fledged industrialization did not commence in the 1950s, most social scientists tend to neglect the decade's importance in shaping contemporary South Korean society. Conversely, a study of 1950s South Korea is crucial to understanding modern ROK society. Some legacies of Confucianism and colonialism (1910–1945) might have remained in the 1950s, but the ROK's forced entry into the world economic system, Cold War politics, and fratricidal warfare in the form of the Korean War established the framework for the subsequent evolution of South Korea. Specifically, the Korean War constituted the dividing line that dramatically transformed the fabric of South Korean society.

Modern familialism in the ROK first appeared during the 1950s with the explosion of educational and religious institutions, which may be the most notable characteristics of postwar South Korea, along with its subsequent rapid economic development. Over the longer term, many mutually dependent factors, from the historical, cultural, structural, and contextual, might have caused the blossoming of academic institutions and the rapid growth of churches. This article focuses on the 1950s, when national division and the war affected South Korean society as overwhelming political conditions, which accounted for the exceptional growth of and enthusiastic support for churches and colleges that would remain hallmarks of South Korean society thereafter. While the growth of Christianity and popular zeal for education emerged before Korea's liberation in 1945, events in the 1950s irreversibly shaped their contemporary forms. The 1950s thus constituted a prototype of contemporary South Korean society.

As Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron explain, the church and the school in a capitalist society function as a system reproducing ideology.¹⁵ Similarly, Antonio Gramsci states that these organizations serve the hegemonic functions of the state, inducing consent from the populace and legitimizing the capitalist system. As crucial parts of civil society, these organizations constitute the moral basis of the state.¹⁶ In Korea during the 1950s, they functioned

15 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (London: Sage Publications, 1977).

16 Antonio Gramsci states that “the three elements—religion, State and party—are indissoluble” because a positive or negative conception of a world (religion) is a crucial element of a State. In Western modernization, Gramsci emphasized, while Church and State stood

as a kind of political organization that sought to stabilize anti-Communist capitalism. Both by modern state-building and the ensuing hardships that the two Koreas suffered as a consequence of division and war heavily affected the growth and characteristics of these organizations. The historical formation of the South Korean state can explain the speedy expansion of churches and schools and the special roles they played in the ROK's economic development, as well as the unique political circumstances of postwar South Korea.

As J.P. Nettl has pointed out, liberal Britain, which led the modernization process, has historically had an underdeveloped concept of the state compared to its continental European counterparts. This legacy, that the United States to some extent shared, has meant that the two hegemonic powers in the international system during the previous two centuries have had more flexibility in achieving their goals than Germany or France, who evolved more formal concepts of state functions and administration.¹⁷ Social scientists have shed light on institutionalized competition and conflict among members of society, and the emergence of political institutions and the state as the products of such feuding. However, they ignore the fact that the modern state is a product of war, as well as capitalist development. The building of the South Korean capitalist state began in 1948 in a divided country confronting a hostile socialist state to the north, developing thereafter during a de facto internal military conflict and then, after North Korea's invasion in June 1950, full-fledged conventional war. The ceasefire in July 1953 solidified national division as an

in perpetual conflict as entities representing the totality of civil society, the former has become an integral part of the State. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 266.

- 17 J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 559–92. "In England," J.P. Nettl writes, "there obviously also exists a well-developed form of central administration, but it is a much more autonomously institutionalized collectivity in its own right." *Ibid.*, p. 580. In the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, in the absence of developed notions of state, Nettl asserts, political parties have played an important role in shaping the dynamics of their respective political systems. "It is not, of course, argued that American, British, or even Soviet de-emphasis of the primacy of the state, or even of the existence of stateness, is in itself necessarily conducive to more effective goal-attainment," he explains. "It is rather that the absence of a potentially inhibiting tradition of stateness may make the development of functional political prerequisites for goal-attainment easier and more flexible." *Ibid.*, p. 588. See also, Dong-Choon Kim, "How the National Division and the Korean War Affected South Korean Politics: The Notions of 'Liberty', 'Democracy', and 'Welfare,'" in *Contemporary Korean Political Thought in Search of a Post-Eurocentric Approach*, Kang Jung In, ed. (New York: Lexington Books, 2014), 45–64.

internalization of Korea's "Cold War." These international and intra-national dynamics over-determined the future of South Korea's politics and society.

One might consider the consolidation of an anti-Communist system during and after the Korean War, in terms of law, policy, ideology, and composition of a ruling class, a paramount characteristic of 1950s South Korea. While one can date the origins of anti-communism in East Asia in the Japanese colonial period, especially the World War II era, the predominant influence on South Korea's anti-communism were the policies of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) from 8 September 1945 to 15 August 1948. During postwar U.S. military occupation of South Korea, the USAMGIK oppressed and eventually outlawed leftist political groups and peasant organizations. The USAMGIK reemployed Japanese-trained Korean police and bureaucrats to crack down on leftist movements. North Korea's invasion on 25 June 1950 initiated a moment of anti-Communist hysteria across South Korea, which also ignited full-blown McCarthyism in the United States.¹⁸ Throughout the Korean War, the ROK government abolished left-leaning labor unions, peasant unions, and youth groups and then killing members or causing them to disappear. The three-year war consolidated the anti-Communist regime in South Korea, where anti-communism gained a dogmatic adherence. Only rightists entered the National Assembly or obtained government positions. Consequently, the conflict suffocated all social movements that had flourished before the Korean War.¹⁹

Warfare usually dismantles pre-existing social structures and replaces them with new systems. This was true of the Korean conflict, which also threatened the existing economic and social system. In South Korea, as in Europe, war

18 Dong-Choon Kim, "The Social Grounds of Anticommunism in South Korea: Crisis of the Ruling Class and Anticommunist Reaction," *Asian Journal of German and European Studies* 2, no. 7 (April 2017), <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40856-017-0018-1> (accessed 25 June 2017).

19 In the 1950s, and even in the early 21st Century, any South Korean who does not criticize "Reds" and Communists earns the label of being a Communist. See Dong-Choon Kim, "The Korean War and Change of Dominant Ideology," in *The Korean War and Social Change*, Korean Sociological Association, ed. (Seoul: Pulbit Publishing, 1992), 174. Anti-communism in the 1950s was not just a political ideology, but a kind of religion that dominated the everyday lives of citizens and gave meaning and a viewpoint to the people. Along with pro-Americanism, anti-communism ruled every corner of civil society and no one could cast doubt on the status quo or criticize it. Compared to anti-communism before the Korean War, the postwar movement secured a strong subjective base as an "organic ideology" that mobilized the masses and restricted the terrain of political struggles. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 377.

consolidated the state. Korea was a newly divided country and the global Cold War became a source for creating and legitimizing domestic politics. South Korea's peculiar position of being under threat from North Korean communism forced President Syngman Rhee to effect drastic land reform, removing the landlord class and suddenly making way for a society of small, but atomized, peasant farmers. Wars, in the process of modernization, often tear apart the feudal status system and create new opportunities for competition in peasant societies. When the old status system disappears because of liberation, war, or urbanization, the "liberated" people look to exploit educational opportunities to secure economic benefits and social mobility for their children. While the Korean War and land reform did not bring about industrialization immediately, these events destroyed the traditional Confucian social system and made way for an achievement-oriented society.

The Korean War, then, transformed a newly born state into an omnipotent "Leviathan" which subordinated atomized people under its sway. In discussing the Russian Revolution, Gramsci makes note of how the "state is everything in the East while civil society is weak and underdeveloped." Japanese militarism had solidified Korea's long tradition of a centralized state, and the Korean War revived the state's dominance over civil society. Widespread state violence and massacres during the war also intimidated people who the ROK government put under its direct control.²⁰ Extreme misery, forced family separation, desperation, and ideological confrontation were prominent features of South Korean society after the 1953 ceasefire. In fact, the fratricidal war inflicted more emotional injury on all Koreans than any other conflict in modern Korean history. According to Ham Seokhun, "as the peninsula turned into a battlefield of foreign forces and Koreans lost the leverage needed to reunify, they lost self-esteem and gave up attempting to change the nation through civil initiative."²¹

In a society where the people fear the state's oppression, official policy can affect strongly even a personal decision. Political circumstances, such as war,

20 Except for a short period after liberation in August 1945, Koreans endured a long East Asian War dating from the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 to the Korean War armistice in July 1953. War as a condition legitimizing state violence molded the behavior or the "habitus" of Koreans in the 1950s. Dong-Choon Kim, "Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacres—the Korean War (1950–1953) as Licensed Mass Killings," *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no. 4 (December 2004): 523–44.

21 Quoted in Kim Sangbong, "Kündae kukkarül nömösön naranül wihayö Ham Sökhön kwa t'ongil ch'ölhak" ["Four Countries That Have Developed Out of a Modern State—Ham Seok-heon and his Philosophy on Reunification"], paper presented at the Reconciliation Beyond Memory Conference, 4.3 Research Institute, 3–5 April 2008, Jeju, Republic of Korea.

create structures of opportunity for ordinary people who strive to survive and safeguard their family's welfare. The uncertainty and extreme anxiety that war creates can force people to follow their instincts for survival first. Great sorrow, psychological unease, and trauma cause people to be highly egoistic, and influence their choices and behavior. Historian and social critic Christopher Lasch observes, for example, that "as business, politics, and diplomacy grow more savage and warlike, men seek a haven in a private life, in personal relations, above all in a family—the last refuge of love and decency."²² Individualism or "private-orientedness" can flourish in a laissez-faire state, or in a Leviathan state that terrorizes its people. As Hannah Arendt explains, "totalitarian movements depended less on the structurelessness of a mass society than on the specific conditions of an atomized and individualized mass."²³ Totalitarianism thus demolishes all possible social solidarities. Totalitarianism, state terrorism, and tight surveillance thwart social solidarity, which places individuals just directly under the chain of state order. In 1950s South Korea, the police were ubiquitous and intervened in every arena of society.²⁴

Mass migration from North Korea, before and during the war, shook South Korea's social stability.²⁵ It also weakened the traditional bonds of the rural community and status system, as well as contributing to urbanization and social mobility. The divided Soviet-American occupation after 15 August 1945 already had brought to southern Korea large numbers of migrants from northern Korea, where Soviet-sponsored socialists conducted land reform and repressed Christians. During the eight-year period between liberation and the Korean War ceasefire, the people of northwestern Korea, where some of the most devoted Korean Christians had lived, moved to South Korea. The migrated northwestern Koreans represented the most politically conservative factions in ROK politics, and members of this group filled every high post in Rhee's government. It was in this extremely conservative political context that South Korea's new educational system emerged after liberation, with popular pursuit

22 Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), xiii.

23 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1979), 318.

24 Korean sociologists have themselves been astonished at the lack of cohesiveness of most poor urban neighborhoods. See Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

25 Kim Kwiok, *Wolnamin ūi saenghwal kyŏnghŏmgwa chŏngch'esŏng* [*The Life-experience and Identity of North Korean Migrants: A Study of Migrants from Below*] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999).

of family well being fueling the explosion of schools at the elementary, secondary, and college level.

In 1948, Frank Eversull, the head of the Bureau of College Education in the USAMGIK, commented on Koreans' embrace of education, observing that "throughout my entire life, I have never seen a people who are more interested in education and earnestly want to achieve it than Koreans"²⁶ The spectacular rise in the number of students and educational institutions after 1945 confirmed Eversull's assessment. A survey in 1959 revealed that 97 percent of Seoul residents said that, given the opportunity, they wanted each of their children to earn a university degree.²⁷ From 1945 to 1960, the number of primary school students increased 2.7 times and reached a total of about 2.3 million. There was about a five times increase in the number of middle and high schools and a ten times rise in the number of students. In the same period, the number of colleges and universities increased 2.7 times, while post-secondary student enrollment soared twelve times higher.²⁸ In this way, the 1950s in Korea witnessed an education explosion.

One notable aspect of the expansion of higher education in this period was that Koreans referred to colleges and universities as "Cow-bone Tower"

TABLE 1 Quantitative Expansion of Higher Education Since 1945

year	enrollment (number)	number of institutions	expansion index	
			enrollments	institutions
1945 (8–15)	7,879	28	100	100
1948 (12–31)	24,000	42	305	150
1950	11,358,000	47	144	169
1960 (4–30)	101,041,000	81	1,282	304

SOURCE: QUEEYOUNG KIM, *SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND STUDENT REVOLT: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN CASE* (CAMBRIDGE, MA: HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1975), 176.

26 Lee Kilsang, "Kukkarosŏ Migunchŏngŭi sŏnggyŭkkwa kyoyukchŏngch'aek" ["The Character of the US Military Government as a State and its Education Policy"], *Chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'gu* [*The Review of Korean Studies*] 15, no. 2 (June 1992): 276.

27 Yi Hyeje, "Sŏulsi kajŏk sahoehakjŏk yŏn'gu" ["A Sociological Study of Families in Seoul"], in "Sŏulŭi kajŏk yŏn'gu" ["A Study on Families in Seoul"], *Hanguk Munhwa Eungwon Nonchong* [*Journal of Korean Cultural Studies*] 1 (1959): 43.

28 Queeyoung Kim, *Social Structure and Student Revolt: A Quantitative Analysis of the Korean Case* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1975), 176.

(*ugoltap*), which meant that a person had to sell or kill several cattle to pay tuition. As more than seventy percent of South Koreans resided in poor rural areas, parents sold precious property to educate their children to the college or university level. Liberation in 1945 marked the first occasion in history when all Koreans enjoyed the opportunity of entering higher education, regardless of their status and class.²⁹ The liberal educational system that the USAMGIK introduced gave the populace access to higher education. Ordinary Koreans, who the Japanese had denied access to higher education during the colonial era, not only received the socio-political rights that previously only the ruling class enjoyed, but also more fully appreciated the instrumental value of education. Meanwhile, the USAMGIK, as a *de facto* state, decided to continue the Japanese educational system, especially the former Kyōngsōng Imperial University (later Seoul National University), to maintain social order and recruit from the elite class those who U.S. officials expected to lead a new and liberal South Korea. Through this policy, South Korea's system of higher education represented a combination of the Japanese public and the American private university systems.

From a parental standpoint, the educational system in the new era functioned as an officially sanctioned process for upward mobility. Like other modern societies, the South Korean bureaucratic system used examinations to select certain officials and granted posts to the entitled to reproduce itself. Although French sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passerson emphasize the role of the dominant class in pedagogic action and the educational system, in a country like South Korea in which the state-building project had just begun and the capitalist ruling class had yet to be developed, the state monopolized pedagogic activity almost autonomously without interference from interest groups.³⁰ For the ruling class during Rhee's presidency, schools and other social education institutions were especially important in the postwar socio-political situation first as a tool for preaching state ideology and second to induce people to channel their pursuit of well being using private or individualized means. A central objectives of the USAMGIK's education policy was

29 Imperial Japan already had established the Kyōngsōng (Seoul) Imperial University in 1926 with the objective for educating future Korean bureaucrats in administrating the colony. But as there was a tight screening process in the examination, only rich pro-Japanese families could send their children to this university.

30 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passerson argue that "pedagogic action is, objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power" and "the function of educational system is to perpetuate the structure of class system." Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passerson, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, pp. 5, 195.

to spread anti-Communist, pro-American ideology among students, which served to encourage their embrace of the U.S.-led capitalist market system.³¹ Rhee's government co-opted this approach when it introduced the system of compulsory elementary education in 1949, which met the perceived basic rights and needs of the people. This act also afforded Rhee the means to "instill loyalty to the new state," Michael Seth argues, and to socialize the nation's youth to become "good citizens of the Republic of Korea."³² Rhee also purged left-leaning teachers from schools and proclaimed that education should have, as its first priorities, patriotism and anti-communism.

After liberation in August 1945, southern Korea experienced a revival of the old Confucian institution of using examinations—*kwagŏ*—to recruit civil servants, but with new clothes when the USAMGIK introduced fierce and competitive entrance examinations. Every government and civil organization requested higher degrees for employment.³³ The openness of opportunities for education, the establishment of new higher educational institutions, and the revival of the cultural heritage of the Confucian talent-selecting system joined to ignite Koreans' education fever as a mechanism of inducing people's aspirations for power and prestige. This frenetic expansion of educational institutions was symbolic of the unbounded character of social mobility.³⁴ Considering that most South Koreans opted to follow this strategy meant that the ROK's ruling class could induce consent from the populace. Nevertheless, the onset of South Korea's education fever during the U.S. military occupation and the first two years of the ROK was a result of many factors, such as traditional Confucian culture and old *kwagŏ* excitement, as well as the USAMGIK's introduction of a new educational system and egalitarian ideas.

The explosion of higher education in enrollments and institutions immediately after World War II reflected the depth of the postwar aspirations of South Koreans to attain degrees. But the special socio-political context that accelerated the trend after the Korean War requires consideration, including the ROK government's enactment of land reform and its suppression of socialist alternatives which flourished in the short period after liberation that

31 Lee, "Kukkarosŏ Migunchŏngŭi sŏnggyŭkkwa kyoyukchŏngch'aek," p. 201.

32 Michael J. Seth, *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 81.

33 In this meritocratic system, competitive entrance examinations functioned to divide the students into hierarchically ranked high schools and universities according to their performance. South Koreans think that a top-ranked university graduate deserves the rewards of goods, prestige, and power, which, through their qualifications, society accords them.

34 Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 221, 171.

strengthened the anti-Communist sentiment of the citizenry. The Korean War serves as an interlude between the revolutionary wave of social movements sweeping across South Korea during the post-liberation period and the full-scale establishment of anti-communism in the 1950s. Discussion of four dimensions is necessary to achieve a clear understanding of the reasons for the intensification of education fever during the years after the armistice.

First, land reform that the ROK government began to implement just before the Korean War began forced the old landlord class to divert its property to educational institutions.³⁵ Land reform signified initiation of the modernization process in South Korea, when people could gain power and prestige in a meritocracy, rather than belonging to an aristocracy. In Korea's rural-based poor peasant society, land reform turned the population into small land owners and began a significant transformation of what they believed was possible to accomplish in their lives. Middle class consciousness and achievement-oriented behaviors among farmers ignited long-suppressed yearnings of higher education for their children.

Second, the devastation resulting from the Korean War, which Janice Kim describes in her article earlier in this issue, created an impetus for education fever. Higher education in South Korea in the 1950s fulfilled the population's aspirations to pursue upward mobility and economic success, as happened in other modern countries. It also had special meaning in a postwar society suffering from a kind of professional poverty that existed throughout the country. When Koreans lost everything to the war, they found the only way to ensure their family's future was to educate their children. They learned significant lessons from their wartime experiences, including the recognition that although tangible property had disappeared, human or promising capital, their sons and daughters, remained. Foreigners were surprised to see that even in the refugee city of Pusan during wartime, students assembled in tent classes.

Third, the Korean War removed all traces of socialism in South Korea. Fighting in what was a fierce ideological conflict motivated the ROK to eliminate all collectivist and progressive options for transforming South Korean society. Rhee's regime functioned as a kind of "White dictatorship" that dismantled and prohibited venues for collective social transformation to prevent imposition of "Red totalitarianism." In an era of anti-Communist authoritarianism, the ROK government eradicated social alternatives to the dominant anti-Communist ethos, including local people's committees, peasant organizations,

35 Kang Ch'angdong, "Han'guk sahoe hangnyökyöng e kwanhan sahoehagjök yön'gu" ["A Sociological Studies on the Korea's Degreecracy"], unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 1993, p. 110.

trade unions, and progressive political parties, shutting them down or turning them into state-sponsored organizations. Instead, education in postwar South Korea gained the unique function of upgrading one's personal fortune.

Fourth, American influence on the South Korean educational system gained strength throughout the 1950s. As the United States was "saving" South Korea from total collapse and Communist domination, its people were accepting and applying wholesale American systems and values, including individualism and a merit system. As the war removed sentiments of social solidarity, South Korea became more of an achievement-oriented society than before the Korean War. When Rhee's government silenced the expression of the collective voice and the uncertainty of war atomized the people, ordinary Koreans resorted to the pre-existing family solidarity to survive and secure their futures.

Historically, the Korean family as a social unit functioned as a haven or shelter in a "heartless" world, as well as a stepping stone to turning itself into a unit of prosperity. In this sense, one should regard education as a family enterprise in actively adapting to the political circumstances that existed in postwar Korea. While scholars have emphasized the function of education in East Asia as an instrument maintaining the ruling system, it always has been more dependent on better family background or family-wide resource mobilization than on individual intellectual capacity. From the pre-modern era, the value of education derived from the belief that it enhanced intellectual capacity or human cultivation. However, in reality, people sought educational opportunity for basically utilitarian motives—a respectable means of earning income and enhancing social prestige. Students mostly subordinated their personal propensities and academic concerns to their parents' desire for improving the family's well-being. The first son, for whom the Korean family combined all its resources, usually bore the burden of the family's destiny. Since 1945, a student's earnest will to learn never drove education fever as much as a family's yearning to improve its status. By forcing its children to soldier through the battles of entrance examinations and then acquiring degrees from prestigious high schools or universities, the South Korean family won the meritocratic war.

South Koreans were unique in that they put every resource into their children's education, minimizing spending and even skipping meals to send their children to the best institutions of higher learning. Like *kwagŏ* fever in pre-modern Chosŏn Korea, the aspiration to obtain the degrees of higher education after 1945 was twofold—as an adaptive attitude for familial success and as part of a fierce competition among extended family members, which sometimes sparked intra-familial conflict. The examination system forced family solidarity to take a backseat to the ideal of political and economic power. While this obsession with pedagogy was not a new phenomenon for post-Korean War

South Koreans, attaining college and university degrees to promote family welfare became a kind of religion in the 1950s.

The mood of distrust and uncertainty during the Korean War forced people to cling to their families. Most South Koreans who fortunately survived the war, appreciated that even minimal involvement in politics and social organizations could have fatal results. The war taught them that they should avoid these activities by any means if they sought to protect their families. As large portions of South Korea's population lost loved ones, mental and emotional traumas stopped them from participating in extra-familial activities in the 1950s. The private or family-promotion strategy became the only option for South Koreans. Familialism may be reflexive behavior to cope with terrible political disasters like war, but it was also a function of the despotic state, in that rulers sought to create politically disinterested or selfish citizens. The familialism underpinning the education fever of the 1950s showed that the pre-modern "habitus" had revitalized into a new form under the extraordinary socio-political situation—the Korean War—that permitted only private self-improvement. Education fever eventually reproduced Korea's anti-Communist and capitalist system. Thus, one should regard Korea's education fever both as a legacy of tradition and as a socio-politically induced phenomenon.

Just as education thrived after the Korean War, so too did religiosity and churches in South Korea. Indeed, the 1950s in the ROK experienced a period of religious explosion. All varieties of religions, including Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism, to some extent enjoyed a marked revival. For example, the number of shamans and fortune-tellers increased almost twofold from 1955 to 1960.³⁶ However, the spread of Christianity was the most significant religious development after the Korean War. Between 1952 and 1960, the number of Catholics increased about three times, while the number of Protestants grew by 50 percent.³⁷ At the same time, a division among Christians and new unorthodox variants of Christian movements also characterized South Korean society in the 1950s. Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church and Pak T'aesŏn's *Chŏndogwan* sects were the most illustrative examples. Charismatic leaders from northern Korea led both varieties of unorthodox Christianity that benefited from appeal to a war-torn society. Several factors contributed to the occurrence of these phenomena.

36 Haptong t'ongsinsa [Haptong News Agency], *Haptong yŏn'gam 1964* [*Haptong Yearbook 1964*] (Seoul: Haptong t'ongsinsa, 1964), 1002.

37 Kang Inch'ŏl, "Han'guk chŏnjaenggwa chonggyo saenghwal" ["The Korean War and Religious Life"], *Hallim taehakkyo Asia munhwa yŏn'guso* [*Institute of Asian Cultural Studies in Hallym University*] 16, (December 2000): 242.

Christianity enjoyed a favorable status after Korea's liberation and during the Korean War partly because the USAMGIK appointed Christians to important administrative positions. Furthermore, it distributed much of the property it confiscated from Japanese landowners to churches. American involvement in the Korean War then encouraged continuation of this trend. Church groups distributed U.S. economic aid, especially food and clothes, to distressed South Koreans. Protestantism under Rhee's government achieved socio-political dominance because most of the influential members of the political leadership were members of these denominations. President Rhee's unwillingness to punish pro-Japanese collaborators was a great relief for Protestant churches because they housed many who bolstered colonial rule.³⁸ As the percentage of Protestants in Rhee's government increased during the Korean War, the ROK government became more of a "Protestant regime" than it had been when the conflict began.³⁹

President Rhee privileged Christianity. He designated Christmas Day, for example, a national holiday, as well as introducing chaplains into the military and the prison system. His church-friendly policy in combination with anti-communism and pro-Americanism helps explain the disproportionate growth of Christianity in comparison with other religions during the 1950s, especially after the Korean War. In both urban and rural areas, the church was the only legal civic group or social organization that remained. Furthermore, churches in Seoul functioned as both spiritual and practical centers, as refugees from North Korea who were burdened with social and employment problems became members. For new arrivals in an unfamiliar land, refugee-administered churches and leading evangelists like Kyung Chik Han, founder of the Young Nak Presbyterian Church, provided "home-like communities" for uprooted North Koreans.

Catastrophic situations, extreme chaos, and the misfortune and misery that postwar Koreans suffered provided fertile terrain for the growth of new church movements.⁴⁰ These hardships turned Koreans toward renewing and strengthening their faith. Religious leaders founded several new Christian movements in refugee centers like Pusan and Kōje, where those who had lost

38 Kang Inch'öl, "Han'guk ch'odaejōngbuūi kidokkyojōk sōnggyōk" ["Pro-Protestant Characteristics of the Early Korean Government"], *Han'guk kidokkyowa yōksa* [*Korean Christianity and History*] 30 (March 2009): 122.

39 Kang, "Han'guk ch'odaejōngbuūi chonggyo saenghwal," p. 122.

40 No Chi Jun, *Han'guk kidokkyōūi sahoehak* [*Sociology of the Korean Protestant Church*] (Seoul: Hanul, 1998).

their homes and possessions assembled.⁴¹ Also, refugees established numerous new churches. Because Christian groups distributed relief aid from the United Nations, refugees acquired needed food and goods at a religious venue.⁴² More than four hundred refugee pastors from North Korea worked among the Christians. Significantly, Pusan had more than a score of new churches that met in tents, in old war houses, and “in hillside groves.”⁴³

Emphasizing family solidarity and community, new “unorthodox” Christian movements could appeal to Koreans who had lost valued family members. Under such sad and uncertain conditions, religion became a shelter for those who lost their family in the war. The rapid growth of the religious population and of the new variants of churches, may be partly due to the fragile psychological condition of many war survivors. While Confucian culture valued the importance of the family and the virtue of filial piety, post-war familialism originated in the specific socio-political circumstances people faced in the 1950s.

Churches were privileged in their ability to gather people together within and between villages, counties, and regions. In the prevailing anti-Communist atmosphere, Christianity as a symbol of the ongoing anti-Communist “crusade” during the Korean War verified one’s first-class citizenship. Due to the political recognition of the association of church membership with anti-communism, bereaved family members of massacred leftist suspects, along with refugees from North Korea, led South Korea’s boom in Christianity after the Korean War. The village of Kyodong, near Kanghwa Island, might be a typical case in terms of the presence of churches in the town. Located near on the west coast near the border with North Korea, Kyodong was a place where ROK government forces had killed many of its inhabitants on suspicion of serving the North Korean Communists.⁴⁴ In 2007, twelve protestant churches maintained missions in Kyodong, which had a population of 3,000, and ten of the twelve initiated operations after the Korean War. Some churches provided certificates of membership to people suspected of being Communists, as they sought shelter from the ROK’s anti-Communist government. To belong to a Christian church, especially perhaps for those who stood at the edge of the South Korean regime, meant to secure a certificate of first class citizenship.

41 Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1954), 169.

42 Churches distributed most of the U.S. economic aid, especially food and clothes, to needy South Koreans and refugees from both Koreas during the Korean War.

43 Oliver, *Syngman Rhee*, pp. 169–71. Clergymen from northwest Korea who fled south before and during the Korean War built most of the mega-churches in contemporary Seoul.

44 In the 1950s and 1960s, many former soldiers stationed on the island became clergymen.

Extraordinary political circumstances—national division and a brutal war—contributed the most to the growth of churches in modern South Korea. From the beginning, these houses of worship functioned as civic and social organizations that ministered to the needs of people who found themselves uprooted from their hometowns. Church organizations thus helped their congregants find jobs, provided information and education, and created opportunities for meeting fellow villagers and family members. There are interesting parallels between churches in the ROK and Korean churches in the United States in that the latter function not only as religious organizations, but also as civic centers for Korean Americans, especially perspective Korean immigrants seeking assistance in their relocation. For Korean Americans, including students and temporary residents, churches continue to provide linguistic, legal, and community-based assistance. The role of Korean churches in the United States as organizations promoting social networking and safeguarding of families replicated what existed in post-1953 South Korea.

Rising anti-Communist sentiment among South Koreans after 1945 was the main factor encouraging the vitality of the evangelism that came to dominate Protestantism in the ROK after the Korean War.⁴⁵ The catastrophic circumstances the conflict created, such as political chaos, crime, poverty, loss of loved ones, and the migration and forced separation of families, also might explain the prevalence of “Praying for a Blessing” in South Korean Christianity. The common practice of Protestant church leaders endorsing ultra-conservatism, anti-communism, and pro-Americanism has drawn much attention. Korean Christians saw U.S. participation in the war as a divine blessing. In the world view of South Korean Christians, pro-Americanism and anti-communism went hand in hand. Senior leaders of evangelistic churches represented the fore-runners of the political right wing in the ROK. Conservatism in South Korea’s Protestant Church persists as a notable characteristic. Some observers attribute it to the role of U.S. Presbyterian missionaries who preached Christianity to Koreans, but the political context—national division, mass refugees from North Korea, three years of war, and societal devastation, in which those conservative fractions in Christianity flourished—also demands consideration. During the Korean War, most progressive and even some liberal Christian leaders in political orientation could not evade the red-hunting and mutual killings. Ultra-conservatives with anti-Communist and pro-American tendencies, then, monopolized church politics under the firm sponsorship of the Rhee government. The facilitating factor was the influence of refugees from

45 Timothy S. Lee, *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), Chapter 3.

North Korea—*wolnamin*—on South Korean society before, during, and after the Korean War. The northern Korean clergymen and their congregations intimately shaped and even dominated the emergence of the ultra-conservatism of South Korean churches after 1953.⁴⁶ In part, this was because the very act of migration from North Korea alone signified proof of an anti-Communist stance, allowing northern Korea ministers to rise to the center of the religious power structure. They also had good relations with American missionaries who enjoyed a privileged position in Korea, since U.S. military occupation officials ruled South Korean politics. After having experienced suppression under North Korea's Communist regime, they transformed themselves into strong anti-Communists in South Korea. This dichotomy of their world view—enemy and friend, communists and anti-communists—matched elements of the fundamentalist world view of conservative Christianity. Religion is always a search for meaning and a means for finding shelter from suffering and the material life, which may be why so many people joined evangelistic churches in South Korea. While some explain the expansion of churches as God's blessing, one also can attribute the phenomenon to the dominance of anti-communism as a social and political ideology and the privileged position of Christians under Rhee's government.

This article has shown how during the 1950s, Christianity and educational achievement were the means for Koreans to break through the misery, devastation, and powerlessness that the Korean War had caused. Under such uncertain and pessimistic social conditions, religion was the safest haven for those who had lost family members in the conflict. Along with education, religion was a promising route in securing familial welfare for South Koreans. Among the several religions and denominations, however, Protestant churches were more popular for the uprooted people residing in urban areas. These two privately motivated daily activities, education and religion, captured the concern of South Korea's people who lost everything in the war. Under Rhee's police state and infrastructural ruin, religious and educational organizations filled the vacuum that the Korean conflict had left in civil society. The South Korean "habitus" of family promotion in the 1950s foretold the fast economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s.

South Korea in the 1950s also witnessed the growth of a new familialism. Although Confucianism describes virtue as a practice that stems from the family and extends to the public, this new familialism tended to focus on familial promotion as a final goal. Traditional Confucian family-centeredness thus

46 Kang Incheol, "Protestant Church and Wolnamin: An Explanation of Protestant Conservatism in South Korea," *Korea Journal* 44, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 157–90.

turned into a new type of familialism—the family’s accumulation of power and money. The family was to compensate for everything that it had lost in the war. Ethical understandings and political decisions were secondary to the main priority of family promotion. Accordingly, ordinary people traded their political participation for personal mobility through education and religion. This contributed to a strange mixture of colonialism and Americanism coming to characterize South Korea in the 1950s. Pro-Japanese and pro-American elites who valued their personal success led society. Meanwhile, Koreans of all classes centered their lives around their family’s well-being, which provided a fertile terrain during the 1950s for dictatorship, corruption, and social disintegration. This explains why high school students in the 19 April 1960 uprising fought against and ultimately toppled the Rhee government, calling for the removal of the old ways. “Down with existing generations,” young protesters screamed.

While historically conditioned, the surprising growth of churches and universities in contemporary South Korea was also a socially and politically conditioned phenomenon. One must view the Cold War, and Korea’s position at the forefront of the U.S.-led anti-Communist bloc, as creating for South Koreans the contextual circumstances in which they pursued their perceived interests. The USAMGIK and President Rhee’s suppression of Communist and opposition movements, along with land reform and the introduction of a Western educational system, induced fragmented units of families to pursue their goals in an atomistic fashion that ignored the public good. In this sense, historically, “education fever” represented a war against collectivist alternatives in society. When the road to solidarity and collectivity had proven too dangerous to select, people concluded that they had little choice but to seek their own family promotion, while ignoring public values. Moreover, there is overrepresentation or, in some respects, misrepresentation of schools, as well as churches, in a South Korean civil society that neglects a citizen’s public participation. Consequently, the overdevelopment of schools and churches has become a monumental obstacle for the healthy development of social and political life in the ROK. In this sense, the remarkable growth in churches and congregations may not signify the deepening of religious mentality. Rather, as Ham Sökhön states, it may illustrate the philosophical or even religious “poverty” of modern South Koreans.⁴⁷

Objectionable phenomena have accompanied South Korea’s surprising rapid economic development, including, among other unhappy events, a fierce

47 Kim Sangbong, “Kündae kukkarül nömösön nararül wihayö Ham Sökhön kwa tongil ch’ölhak.”

competition for school entrance examinations, a reduced quality of life, and an underdevelopment of civil society. The rate of suicides in South Korea is highest among OECD countries, and the country also ranks among the lowest of the developed countries in measures of happiness. Furthermore, in a staunchly anti-Communist South Korea, the numbers of people in labor unions remains below ten percent, which also may be the lowest among developed countries. Community organization and civic participation in rice roots politics historically has been very underdeveloped, although there have been advances in the political democratization of the ROK government. Thus, understanding current Korean society in a more comprehensive manner requires consideration of the qualitative aspects of economic development and democracy together with quantitative measures.

Many scholars focus on the economic development drive that Pak Chŏng-hŭi initiated in the 1960s and the popular struggle to end military dictatorship that succeeded in 1987 to explain South Korea's economic miracle and its salient democratization. This customary understanding of postwar South Korea, however, is not entirely accurate. As in other countries in East Asia, the capitalism that took root in South Korea has been one without justice or fair competition. It has been a capitalism that systematically excludes organized labor and precludes the possible emergence of a thriving labor party. South Korea's socioeconomic system largely has drawn energy from education fever and familism to make rapid economic growth possible, but it also casts deep shadows of social disequilibrium that likely will last for several more decades to come.

Selected Bibliography

Primary Sources

Haptong t'ongsinsa [Haptong News Agency]. *Haptong yŏn'gam 1964* [*Haptong Yearbook 1964*]. Seoul: Haptong t'ongsinsa, 1964.

Secondary Sources

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1979.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage Publications, 1977.

Buswell, Robert E. and Timothy Lee, Eds. *Christianity in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006.

Dore, Ronald. *Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987.

- "Education." OECD Better Life Index, <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/education/> (accessed 26 May 2017).
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Henderson, Gregory. *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Johnson, Andrew. "A Crisis of Integrity in Seoul, the Megachurch Capital of the World," USC Center for Religion and Civic Culture, <https://crcc.usc.edu/a-crisis-of-integrity-in-seoul-the-megachurch-capital-of-the-world/> (accessed 28 May 2017).
- Kang, Ch'angdong. "Han'guk sahoe hangnyökpöyöng e kwanhan sahoehajök yön'gu" ["A Sociological Studies on the Korea's Degreecracy." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 1993.
- Kang, Incheol. "Protestant Church and Wolnamin: An Explanation of Protestant Conservatism in South Korea." *Korea Journal* 44, No. 4 (Winter 2004): 157–90.
- Kang, Inch'öl. "Han'guk chönjaenggwa chonggyo saenghwal" ["The Korean War and Religious Life"]. *Hallim taehakkyo Asia munhwa yön'guso* [Institute of Asian Cultural Studies in Hallym University] 16 (December 2000): 237–78.
- Kang, Inch'öl. "Han'guk ch'odaejöngbuüi kidokkyojök sönggyök" [Pro-Protestant Characteristics of the Early Korean Government]. *Han'guk kidokkyowa yöksa* [Korean Christianity and History] 30 (March 2009): 91–129.
- Kim, Dong-Choon. "Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacres—the Korean War (1950–1953) as Licensed Mass Killings." *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, No. 4 (December 2004): 523–44.
- Kim, Dong-Choon. "How the National Division and the Korean War Affected South Korean Politics: The Notions of 'Liberty', 'Democracy', and 'Welfare.'" In *Contemporary Korean Political Thought in Search of a Post-Eurocentric Approach*, Jung-in Kang, ed., 45–64. New York: Lexington Books, 2014.
- Kim, Dong-Choon. "The Korean War and Change of Dominant Ideology." In *The Korean War and Social Change*, Korean Sociological Association, ed., 135–77. Seoul: Pulbit Publishing, 1992.
- Kim, Dong-Choon. "The Social Grounds of Anticommunism in South Korea: Crisis of the Ruling Class and Anticommunist Reaction." *Asian Journal of German and European Studies* 2, No. 7 (2017): 2–25.
- Kim, Dong-Choon. *The Unending Korean War: A Social History*. Sung-ok Kim, Trans. Larkspur, CA: Tamal Vista Publishers, 2009.
- Kim Dongchun. *Chönjaeng kwa sahoe* [War and Society]. Seoul: Tolbaegae, 2004.
- Kim, Dongno. "The Transformation of Familism in Modern Korean Society: From Cooperation to Competition." *International Sociology* 5, No. 4 (December 1990): 409–25.

- Kim Hŭng. *Han'guk chŏnjaenggwa kidoksinang hwaksan yŏn'gu* [*The Korean War and the Spread of "Praying for a Blessing"*]. Seoul: Han'guk kidoggyo yŏksa yŏn'guso, 1999.
- Kim Kwiok. *Wolnamin ūi saenghwal kyŏnghŏmgwa chŏngch'esŏng* [*The Life-experience and Identity of North Korean Migrants: A Study of Migrants from Below*]. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999.
- Kim, Queeyoung. *Social Structure and Student Revolt: A Quantitative Analysis of the Korean Case*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1975.
- Kim Sangbong. "Kŭndae kukkarŭl nŏmŏsŏn nararŭl wihayŏ Ham Sŏkhŏn kwa t'ongil ch'ŏlhak" ["For Countries That Have Developed Out of a Modern State—Ham Seokheon and his Philosophy on Reunification"]. Paper delivered at the Reconciliation Beyond Memory Conference, 4.3 Research Institute, 3–5 April 2008, Jeju, Republic of Korea.
- Lasch, Christopher. *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged*. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
- Lau, Siu Kai. "Chinese Familism in an Urban-Industrial Setting: The Case of Hong Kong." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 43, No. 4 (November 1981): 977–92.
- Lee, Hyosik. "Korean Students Least Happy in OECD." *The Korea Times*, 4 May 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/05/113_86432.html (accessed 28 May 2017).
- Lee, Kilsang. "Kukkarosŏ Migunchŏngŭi sŏnggyŭkkwa kyoyukchŏngch'aek" ["The Character of the US Military Government as a State and its Education Policy"]. *Chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'gu* [*The Review of Korean Studies*] 15, No. 2 (1992): 193–209.
- Lee, Timothy S. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010.
- Nakamura, Takayasu. "Educational System and Parental Fever in Contemporary Japan: Comparison with the Case of South Korea." *KEDI Journal of Educational Policy* 2, No. 1 (2005): 35–49.
- Nettl, J.P. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics* 20, 4 (July 1968): 559–92.
- No Chi, Jun. *Han'guk kidokkyoŭi sahoehak* [*Sociology of the Korean Protestant Church*]. Seoul: Hanul, 1998.
- "Obama Remarks on Math, Science and Technology Education," *Washington Post*, 23 November 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/23/AR2009112301978.html> (accessed 28 May 2017).
- Oliver, Robert T. *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth*. New York: Dodd Mead, 1954.
- "Over 27,000 Korean Missionaries Ministering Worldwide, According to Study." *Christianity Daily*, 8 June 2016, <http://www.christianitydaily.com/articles/8179/20160608/over-27-000-korean-missionaries-ministering-worldwide-according-study.htm> (accessed 27 May 2017).

- Pak Hyein. "Han'guksahoeüi kyoyukyöle taehan yöksajök koch'al: kwagösihömi kajok, sahoe e mich'in yöngyangül chungsimuro" ["Historical Approach to Educational Aspirations: The Influence of Civil Service Examinations, Kwagö, to the Family and Society"]. *Han'gukkajöng kwallihakhoeji [Journal of the Association for Korean Household Management]* 12, No. 1 (1994): 83–92.
- Seth, Michael J. *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.
- Yi Hyoje. "Söulsi kajok sahoehakjök yö'n'gu" ["A Sociological Study of Families in Seoul"]. In "Söulüi kajök yö'n'gu" ["A Study on Families in Seoul"], *Hanguk Munwha Eunguwon Nonchong [Journal of Korean Cultural Studies]* 1 (1959): 9–63.